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Abstract: Despite many reforms, evidence from the past decade proves the Italian 
fiscal policy still being “irresponsible.” The article understands the problem from 
a public choice perspective: irresponsibility is a natural result of unconstrained 
“raw politics,” yet proper institutional designs can bring it under control. It then 
presents qualitative data showing how Italian irresponsibility follows inappropri-
ate constraints, and explains why the recent European provisions can support a 
fruitful institutional change.
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1  Introduction
In 1997, The Economist noted how “Italy had indeed changed: it would do any-
thing – even accept unpleasant budgets – to prove its Euro-worthiness; and, with 
a little bit of presidential prestidigitation, it had put government instability back 
into the box of nasty, first-republic memories, along with corruption, jobs-for-the-
boys and public profligacy.” In those years, the requisites to join the Euro-area 
justified a fiscal discipline as domestically painful as internationally convincing: 
the expectations of Italian solvency, portrayed by the interest rates on the sover-
eign debt, aligned to those of the sounder partners and remarkably improved, 
reaching their best point in 2005 (Figure 1).
Yet, in the second half of the 2000s international investors went back to 
discriminating among sovereign debts; and Italy grouped with Greece, Por-
tugal, Ireland and Spain into the “PIIGS”, the Euro-countries at higher risk of 
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insolvency. Rising interest rates mirrored the European concerns for the capabil-
ity of the Italian economy and, before, of its fiscal policy to meet the requirements 
of the good partnership to the Euro-area as laid down in the Stability and Growth 
Pact.1 Indeed, since 2005 the Commission opened the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
against Italy twice, because of its increasing debt well above the limit of the 60% 
of the GDP and a deficit-to-GDP ratio above the threshold of the 3%.
Such concerns seem even more legitimate if we look at the Italian budget 
from a different perspective than the European performance criteria of debt – 
which governments usually claim to have inherited – or of deficit – which focuses 
on the balance sheet yet misses the underlying strategy.
The dynamics of revenues and expenditures of the public sector (Figure 2) 
provide such a different viewpoint. The Figure shows how the public sector 
spending had been constantly increasing until 2010, while the gap between rev-
enues and expenditures had been mainly addressed from the revenue side. Also, 
the estimated revenues often proved remarkably optimistic.
The Italian governments’ bias towards the best case scenario was not limited 
to revenues. Before, it could be found in the very same data about the economic 
growth rate, annually calculated for a time span of 3 or 5 years (Figure 3).
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Figure 1: Interest Rates on Sovereign Debts, Selected Countries.
Note: Interest rate annual average, 10-year bonds.
Source: Elaboration of data from the European Central Bank.
1 See SEC (2006) 235 fin., SEC (2007) 67 fin., SEC (2008) 105 fin., SEC (2009) 233 fin., SEC (2010) 
293 fin., SEC (2011) 810 fin., COM (2012) 318 fin.
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These figures, mainly meant to give domestical reasons for the government's 
budget proposal, often appeared quite different from those later published by the 
European institute of statistics (Eurostat) – even of the consolidated accounts. 
The Italian governments’ optimism becomes especially evident in forecasts  – 
usually ascribed to increases in the domestic aggregate demand without further 
explanations.
Such bias is especially concerning. Estimated growth rates influence the 
expectations about revenues and expenditures, hence about the financing need: 
thus, budgetary decisions based on optimistic assumptions underestimate the 
risk of deficits (IMF 2007). Moreover, exceedingly confident forecasts indicate an 
irresponsible financial budgeting, in which precautions are neglected so as to 
accommodate a wider array of distributional demands (Hallerberg et al. 2009).
Further evidence that, until recently, Italian financial decisions had been irre-
sponsibly open to special interests comes from Figure 4. Here, the gap is displayed 
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Figure 2: Italy’s Public Sector: Revenues and Expenditures (bln Euros at market prices).
Keys: Solid lines = consolidated values; dashed lines = estimated values; empty dots = estimated 
value of reference for the financial decision.
Note: The concept of public sector includes the central and the local agencies, the social secu-
rity funds, and all those units which meet the requisites defined by the Regulation CE 2223/96 
and following modification. In Italy, after Law no. 311 of 2004, the precise boundary is defined 
by the National institute of statistics (Istat) which yearly publishes the list of included bodies in 
the Gazzetta Ufficiale.
Source: From 1996 to 2006: Relazione Trimestrale di Cassa of December; from 2007 to 2010: 
Relazione Unificata di Economia e Finanza Pubblica, both on data from the State General 
Accounting Department.
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between the aggregate planned spending that the government agreed with line 
ministries and agencies before parliamentary debate, and the one that later passed 
into law. In Figure 4, then, the difference between what was proposed and what 
passed can be ascribed to the parliamentary stage alone of the budgeting process.
The gap proves that the debate always increased the total expenditures – 
although each aggregate contributed differently to the overall dynamics. While 
cuts were passed to the fiscal allocations to the central bodies (the most relevant 
of which in 2007, of –2.9% with respect of the executive’s proposal), as well as to 
the debt service (with the maximum of –3.2% in 2004), the transfers to local and 
regional governments always hiked up (with the maximum in 2007 of +22% with 
respect of an especially austere proposal).
Together, these data portray a decision-making process kept vulnerable to 
demands for further spending – demands which, according to Figure 4, parlia-
mentary dynamics went along with and which, according to Figures 2 and 3, the 
executives were unable or unwilling to restrain. Little surprise that the Italian 
fiscal governance had thus proven incapable of rescuing the budget from the 
“tragedy” that dooms every common pool resource when its consumption is 
improperly regulated (Hallerberg et al. 2009).
Yet, if one takes into account the number of institutional reforms that the Italian 
fiscal policy had undergone in the past decades, such conclusion sounds puzzling 
if not unfair. What, then, has not worked? And what improvements are needed?
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Figure 3: Italy’s GDP, Estimated Annual Increase.
Keys: Solid lines = consolidated values; dashed lines = estimated values; empty dots = estimated 
value of reference for the financial decision.
Source: Continuous series: Eurostat database; 3-year and 5-year data: Relazione Provisionale 
e Programmatica (up to 2010), Documento di Economia e Finanza (from 2011) on data from 
ministerial Departments.
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In answering these questions, this article assumes a rational choice perspec-
tive because of the heuristic and prescriptive gains it allows. Section 2 discusses 
the institutional models that are believed effective, and the conditions for their 
functioning. Section 3 focuses on the Italian reforms to identify which model 
inspired them and why it did not deliver. Section 4 discusses the reasons why the 
recent European fiscal compact can provide a more fruitful direction for institu-
tional reforms. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2  Fiscal Irresponsibility: Causes and Solutions
According to the rational choice theory, fiscal irresponsibility occurs whenever 
elected politicians make an opportunistic use of public revenues, that is, deliver 
short-term benefits to special constituencies while dumping the costs on the 
public debt (Buchanan and Tullock 1965; Weingast et  al. 1981; von Hagen and 
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Figure 4: Italy’s National “economic budgets”: Presented and Passed by Aggregate Expendi-
ture (2000–2011, bln Euros at market prices).
Keys: Empty indicators = proposed expenditure; solid indicators = passed expenditure.
Note: From 1999, the “national economic budget” is made of separate spending macro-aggre-
gates. That of the “central bodies” includes personnel, management, overtime, allowances; 
“transferred” expenditures cover investments and the running costs of regional and local gov-
ernments; “financial liabilities” account for the overall debt service. Until 2002, the spending 
of the constitutional bodies was separated from that of the other central bodies; in the figure, 
the two are aggregated for the sake of comparability. Similarly aggregated are the reserve 
funds, separated since 2004.
The passed budgets for the years 2000 and 2003 are unavailable; the ones before the year 
2000 are hardly comparable because of the outlays aggregation in use.
Source: State General Accounting Department.
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Harden 1995; Poterba and von Hagen 1999). As such, it marks the fiscal “state of 
nature” in democratic systems, where electoral competition requires politicians 
to maintain and widen their consensus. Left to the dynamics of “raw politics” 
alone, when in office politicians thus tend to drain budgets so as to lure voters 
and prevent future policy reversals, while debt allows them to delay and blur the 
issue of who should pay these benefits back.
Rational choice, however, assumes that such natural mechanism can be 
defused, if opportunism is constrained by proper governance designs. Indeed, 
empirical analyses have identified two effective types, “delegation” and “ contract” 
(Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999; Hallerberg 2004; Hallerberg et al. 2009), which 
can neutralise irresponsibility alike – although each relies on  different  defusers, 
has different requirements, and shows different weaknesses.
The delegation type develops along the lines of the British case, and 
revolves around a negative defuser of opportunism – that is, the reduction in 
number of the decision makers. The “political property rights” over budget-
ing are here concentrated into the Ministry of Finance, that is into the only 
decision-maker without a constituency to serve but the taxpayers – which 
structurally guards her from the political incentives to opportunism. With 
the only support of her offices, on the basis of realistic estimations of future 
economic trends and of the governments’ goals, the Minister first sets the 
national distribution of fiscal benefits and costs, then shields such “optimal 
budget” from the pressures of special interests. During the legislative process, 
moreover, those pressures conveyed by parliamentary groups are restrained 
by rules that either limit the Houses’ power to amend the budget proposal, or 
that make variations in the financial envelope into a motion of no-confidence 
in the government. Similarly, in the post-legislative stages opportunism is 
defused by the power that the Ministry of Finance is given over administra-
tion – to stop misspending, as well as to discipline runaway agencies and line 
ministries.
Basically, the fiscal decision is here kept on the track of responsibility 
thanks to a “benevolent dictator.” To the extent that the budgeting process is 
entirely maintained within the Finance Ministry’s discretion, theory expects 
it to not yield to short-term consensus. Such an entrustment however requires 
that the parliamentary majority agrees with any use of fiscal discretion that 
the Ministry of Finance can make. As such, it better suits disciplined single-
party governments, or coalition governments with highly homogeneous 
fiscal preferences.  Delegation is an especially efficient institutional design, 
as power  concentration makes the Ministry of Finance capable of prompt 
responses even to sudden economic crises. However, the proper function-
ing of this governance model can be undermined by political crises – when 
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parliamentary whips lose their ability to maintain functional and territorial 
demands within the limits of party and coalition discipline or, more generally, 
when the trust  relationship between the majority and the Ministry is seriously 
challenged.
Conversely, the contract type derives from the Dutch case, and revolves 
around a positive defuser of opportunism – a binding, transparent framework 
agreement among multiple decision-makers. The type assumes that the het-
erogeneity of fiscal preferences in parliamentary majorities is irreducible, so 
that nobody can be trusted to decide unbiasedly on fiscal matters. Thus, a 
common distributive framework has to be agreed upon beforehand. The result-
ing coalition pact hence takes the form of a mid-term program where – on the 
basis of prudential estimation of future trends – negotiated policy goals and 
performance are made clear, public and measurable. These numeric indica-
tors serve both as the yardsticks against which the legitimacy of distributional 
demands can later be gauged, and as restraints to the discretion of line minis-
tries and agencies. Once the coalition has the policy goals set, the annual deci-
sion simply fine-tunes the fiscal means. Opportunism is then avoided thanks 
to the publicness of indicators and the widespread obligations to account for 
achievement. In each stage, mutual control closes the door on irresponsible 
decisions.
In such model, special pressures are not kept at bay; rather, they are disci-
plined, as their influence on the financial decision is contingent on how they fit 
the coalition pact. To the extent that all the policymakers move within the numer-
ical targets and let their behaviour open to scrutiny, the contract type can thus 
secure fiscal responsibility even of porous processes in plural contexts. However, 
such governance design is less capable of adaptation to unforeseen economic 
conditions. Indeed, prudential estimations can result into surpluses and cushion 
a shock in the short run; yet, when the magnitude of a crisis is such that the 
policy contract proves untenable, the re-negotiation of priorities and targets may 
take too long for timely responses.
The models of contract and delegation together imply a worth theorisation of 
fiscal irresponsibility because of a twofold reason. First, the theory’s pars destru-
ens treats the tragedy of the fiscal common less as a pathology of the political 
system than as the natural result of unrestrained “raw politics” and parliamen-
tary dominance, which can be prevented by proper institutional designs. As such, 
it rejects cultural or historical deterministic positions, and makes room to the 
possibility of policy shift and learning instead. Second, its pars construens does 
not provide a single best solution, but two, each suitable under alternative system 
conditions. Thus, it advances prescriptions that are sensitive to contexts and to 
the principle of adequacy.
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Moreover, that learning can succeed if solutions are adequate to the context 
is an especially consequential point. As Hallerberg et al. (2009) highlight, oppor-
tunism follows ineffective fiscal governance – i.e., designs that either adjust to 
raw politics or enforce the wrong discipline. Thus, relevant to the understanding 
of Italy’s irresponsibility is not simply how far the case has moved from the state 
of fiscal nature, but also in which direction. This is the question to which the next 
section will provide an answer.
3  Fifty Years of Reforms – How Proper?
In the first season of republican budgets, the Italian fiscal decision-making was 
governed by the constitutional provisions alone. Article 81 on the one side gave 
the right of initiative to the executive, yet refused to recognise it a super-ordered 
position to the parliament; on the other, it conceived of the finance act as a yearly 
bookkeeping decision about non-mandatory spending, specifically made to close 
the gap between outlays and receipts. To secure a balanced budget was thus an 
issue to be handled by sectoral acts, each required to provide proper coverage to 
new expenses.
The constitutional rules however fell onto a context where the rationale of 
raw politics prevailed. Preferential voting and the proportional electoral system 
strongly tied the elected officials to special constituencies. The financial act was 
given no special status, so that the consensual rules in use for scheduling ordi-
nary proposals applied – as well as secret vote and filibustering. Log-rolling and 
pork-barrel became common practices that the executive went along with, due to 
its fragmentation, its increasing economic competences, and a budget horizon 
limited to 1 year. The whole design thus promoted an opportunistic use of public 
finance (di Palma 1977; Pasquino 1993; Capano and Giuliani 2001; Jessoula 2012) 
that the Court of Auditors could not restrain.2
In such context, the need to change the fiscal governance already arose in the 
1960s, and triggered a reform process as incremental as wide, which for decades 
has been unfolding at multiple levels – procedural, organisational, institutional 
(Ceccanti 1998; Verzichelli 1999; Vassallo 2000; Fabbrini 2003; Perna 2008; De 
Giorgi and Verzichelli 2008; Goretti and de Ioanna 2008; Goretti and Rizzuto 2010).
2 Detected since the early 1960s, especially with respect to multi-annual spending, the problem 
of resource inadequacy generated an enduring tension between the Court of Auditors and the 
Constitutional Court. In 1966, the latter’s sentence no. 1 put an end to it by establishing the 
obligation to provide explicit coverage to multi-annual spending, yet considering debt as a legiti-
mate means (della Cananea 1997).
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3.1  The Direction of the Shift
First interventions focused on the shape and contents of the fiscal decision-mak-
ing. Law no. 62 of 1964 packed the many fiscal micro-decisions previously spread 
along the whole year into a single annual act, to be discussed in autumn. The 
single act included both an overview of the expenses of the year and the financial 
framework for the next one. In 1967, Law no. 48 changed the nature of such act – 
from a neutral bookkeeping exercise into a strategic decision, functional to the 
executive’s economic goals. The financial framework followed a mid-term plan-
ning document in which the executive gave reason for its fiscal decisions. Such 
planning was presented to the Houses by the Ministry of Budget, which the same 
Law re-named “Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning,” supported by two 
new independent offices – for the analysis of mid- to long-term trends (Ispe), and 
of the state of the economy in the short-term (Isco). The new Ministry was also 
given a co-ordinating position within the executive, and had to provide a perma-
nent secretariat to the new inter-ministerial committee for planning (Cipe), the 
collegial body of the ministries with economic portfolios. It was the Cipe however, 
and not the Minister of Budget, to be entrusted with the definition of guidelines, 
short-term interventions, and administrative mandates that detailed the plan-
ning. The reform thus sorted little effects on opportunism not only because it left 
the parliamentary dynamics and incentives untouched. In the executive it also 
contributed to the blurring of responsibilities and to the loosening of an already 
weak hold on the bureaucracy, as far as almost independent inter-ministerial 
committees proliferated to govern special policies – among the others, industrial, 
foreign trade, transport, price, credit. Moreover, the planning activities were 
decoupled from the monitoring and management of cash flows – the latter being 
under the control of the Ministry of Finance and, within it, of the State General 
Accounting Department. Law no. 48 of 1967 did not build any special relation 
between the Ministry of Budget and that of Finance, simply prescribing that the 
two had to co-operate – once again leaving the actual terms of their interplay to 
raw politics.
Ten years later, Law no. 468 of 1978 tipped the balance in favor of the exec-
utive and, within it, of the Finance Ministry. The “Forecasting and program-
matic report” (Fpr) was added to the early stages of the budgeting procedure, to 
make the connection clearer between the draft provisions, the analysis of state 
of the economy, and the conditions of the public finance as by the Accounting 
 Department’s data. If such knowledge base increased the substantial legitimacy 
of the executive’s proposals, it sorted little disciplining effects on the parlia-
ment’s fiscal discretion: Law no. 468 also added a new decision to the procedure, 
the so-called “financial law,” amending which the parliament could “update” 
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the executive’s proposal and, as a consequence, the whole planning. These 
“updates” usually passed without proper evaluation of their impact on the fiscal 
trends, and easily resulted into over-expenditure. However, Law no. 468 deeply 
altered the meaning of the amounts that the assembly passed, too. From immedi-
ate disbursements, such amounts became ceilings under which the bureaucracy 
had to move; also, actual paying was conditioned to the permit of the Ministry 
of Finance – in reality, of its Accounting Department. The Ministry of Finance 
was also given the capacity of operating adjustments during the fiscal year, so 
to secure coverage. The new fiscal governance thus set the financial law as the 
actual stake of a game still played by the rules of raw politics, of which the Min-
istry of Finance became the ultimate fixer – squeezed between the drifts of the 
bureaucracy on the one side, and the pressures from line ministries and parlia-
mentary groups on the other.
From the end of the 1980s, new provisions strengthened the position of the 
executive in the process to the point that many saw a true regime change in them 
– from consensualism to “functional majoritarianism.” Law no. 362 of 1988 con-
tributed to the shift by constraining the amending power of the parliament – for 
instance, by requiring the financial envelope be voted before the single outlays 
were debated. Also, to the early stage of the budgeting procedure the “Document 
of economic and financial programming” (Defp) was added, which widened the 
contents of the Forecasting and programmatic report and put them in a Euro-
pean perspective. Through the Defp, Law no. 362 intended to make fiscal policy 
into an instrument for achieving macroeconomic goals consistent with the newly 
established Community ends. It also prescribed cost-benefit analysis in support 
of fiscal decisions – though such evaluation would never institutionalize. Even 
more relevant to the regime change was the sterilization of the amending power 
that the parliament itself decided by changing the Houses’ Rules. As from 1983, 
a special session was instituted to pass the budget. In it, pre-defined time alloca-
tion and limits to debate aimed to prevent both scheduling games and filibuster-
ing. Also, secret vote was ruled out. Moreover, the Speakers were given the power 
to debar those amendments which proved inconsistent with the balancing of the 
budget. All in all, constraints were thus provided to log-rolling, which had made 
the fiscal law into a heap of heterogeneous interventions. Yet, despite of these 
changes, the parliament did maintain meaningful powers. The relevant decisions 
were increasingly debated as a different piece of legislation, the so called “related 
provisions,” to which the rules of the budget session once again did not apply. 
In response, the executive reinforced its position in the post-legislative stages 
by an increasing recourse to decrees to operate on fiscal trends, and to “special 
funds” to allow for expenditures of its concerns – thus partially circumventing 
the parliament.
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In the 1990s, the regime change institutionalized. The electoral reform of 
1993, reinforced in 2005, abolished preferential voting and promoted the com-
petition among two coalitions, so affecting the dynamics within the parliament 
as much as the relationship between the parliament and the executive. On the 
side of the parliament, the reform clearly established a majority and an oppo-
sition, and informed appointments and scheduling to the rationale of spoils. 
Though, it could neither reduce the political fragmentation within the Houses, 
nor increase the homogeneity of fiscal preferences within any coalition. Many 
members of the majority from different parties still found reasons for amend-
ments, that the executive counteracted by increasingly calling votes of confi-
dence so to keep the session within its time limits, and the contents stuck to the 
original draft. The executive’s ability to force the process followed the electoral 
reform as much as the reshuffles it underwent. Many inter-ministerial commit-
tees were abolished, the system of funds streamlined, and different fiscal and 
budgeting portfolios brought under the single “super-ministry” of Economy and 
Finance (Mef). Also, the two institutes for economic analysis Ispe and Isco were 
first merged, then neglected and eventually closed down by the Mef as “useless 
agencies” in 2010 – when their competences definitely passed to the Mef itself 
and to the national institute of statistics (Istat). Such concentration structurally 
unbalanced the relationship between the Mef and the parliament in favor of the 
former. Law no. 208 of 1999 contributed to the asymmetry by further reducing the 
parliament’s room of maneuver: in timing, as it established that all the obliga-
tions of the budget session had to be fulfilled in the second half of the year; in 
contents, as the budgets of regional and local governments came to be decided 
of as transfers, and to be governed by the numerical rules of the Internal stabil-
ity pacts – managed and monitored by the Mef itself. At the same time, Law no. 
208 restored the relevance of the financial law, resolving that its provisions could 
intervene on previous sectoral legislation if such changes improved the budget 
balance. This had often been understood as an authorization to increase expendi-
tures and trigger economic growth – although, for such increases to be proposed, 
their positive effects or sustainability had not to be proved.
Of the demands so legitimated, the Mef again was the ultimate fixer thanks 
to two related factors. First, the Ministry is where the knowledge and power are 
concentrated to draft the budget and account to Europe, as required by the mem-
bership to the Euro-area. Indeed, the Ministry of Economy and Finance incorpo-
rates both the Accounting Department and the Finance Directorates – that is, the 
key permitting, monitoring and forecasting functions. Second and consequent, 
the Ministry has grown into the actual gate-keeper between the positions of the 
majority in the parliament and those of the European Commission – hence, the 
one who can reconcile them or exacerbate their incompatibility instead. Indeed, 
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the Mef is responsible of both the documents supporting the domestic fiscal deci-
sions and those addressed to the European partners that account for planned 
reforms. Interestingly enough, not only these documents have long been issued 
at different times of the budgetary process, but often their contents differed one 
another and from the final equilibrium set by the parliament in December or later. 
So, little surprise that, on spring, adjustments were often due to make the cash 
flows fit the European commitments.
3.2  Stability Beneath Change
Over 50 years, reforms have thus incrementally as relentlessly moved the Italian 
fiscal governance toward the delegation type. Yet, the concentration of the budg-
eting capabilities in the executive, and the parallel reduction of the parliament’s 
room for maneuver, has proven unable to sterilise the incentives to opportunism 
and institutionalize fiscal responsibility. Being this the result, the reason can only 
rest on those basic dynamics unaffected by the reforms. The experience that two 
privileged as expert witnesses had of the budgeting process is especially useful in 
casting a light on such dynamics.
According to them, irresponsibility generates at the very beginning of the 
budgeting process, when the financial requirements are estimated. This stage
begins in spring, with the agencies’ requests to the State General Accounting Department 
for increasing future appropriations. Line Ministries feel little responsibility of it and are 
seldom aware of [such] requests …, always incremental so that often, when toted up, they 
exceed the available resources of many dozens of billions of euros. In this stage of the 
process there is not a place where availability can be discussed. The Accounting Department 
lacks competences and interest to evaluate the substance of the spending programs, as well 
as to engage in a dialogue with the agencies: its doings are limited to the management and 
control of the single allocations, and to the exercise of its powers of permit, forbiddance and 
control. From its perspective all outlays are equal, the only cuts are linear, and the only pos-
sibility of reducing the deficit rests on raising taxes, tickets and so on. … Even more complex 
is the problem of estimating the regional and local expenditure. Information is uncertain. 
… Once again, the Accounting Department handles the problem through constraints, caps, 
cuts and the like without being capable of discriminating between different situations, in a 
context of bilateral negotiations with regions, provinces and municipalities according to a 
faction-like rationale. The consequence is a high rate of contentiousness and conflict, later 
destined to dump on the parliamentary debate (Pisauro and Visco 2008: pp. 141–142).
In the following stage, which unfolds within the cabinet, the budget is defined 
through bilateral negotiations first, then collectively. Despite the direct involve-
ment of the line Ministries and of the Mef, the responsibility is still lacking, as
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it is inevitable that those ministers who are politically stronger or closer to the Finance 
Minister get a special treatment. Other negotiations, less evident yet maybe more effective, 
take place between the Accounting Department and single agencies (or parts of them). … 
When the financial draft gets to the Council of Ministries, a marathon of many hours starts, 
with all the line Ministries bargaining with the Finance Minister who, once again, does not 
master every issue thoroughly and is provided with little instruments of defense (but to say 
‘no’ to everybody, thus arousing their wrath). As far as he is concerned, the Prime Minister 
is little informed and unable to guide decisions. Also, he does not want to antagonize any 
line Ministry too much – and less than ever, in a coalition government, any leader of the 
major parties. The … financial draft is smoothened and corrected and eventually approved. 
But the reality is, no one or very few really know what they voted for, and nobody feels 
especially obliged to any restraint (ibid.: p. 142).
When the draft gets to the parliament for consideration, hence,
the line Ministries bustle to mobilize the Members of the competent Commissions so to 
propose and pass favorable amendments at the expense of their colleagues, or better of the 
public finance. The members of the parliament, on their part, seldom have a complete and 
cognizant picture of the fiscal decision and, in any case, are little interested to it. They know 
(or are afraid) that the decision will eventually pass by a vote of confidence, so they focus 
on changes at the margin and mainly on issues of concern of their constituencies …. They 
do not want to waste their time debating and voting anything else. Especially when local 
or regional interests are at stake, representatives from government and opposition parties 
coalesce in fleeting majorities – the opposition being ready to agree on any amendment 
that outvotes the executive. The executive conversely needs the Parliament to pass all these 
provisions that put its programme into action. … It is left with no choice … but to mediate, 
endure and get ready for a vote of confidence (ibid.: pp. 142–143).
Such detailed picture shows that the reforms did not deliver because they proved 
unable to shield the budgeting process from the rationale of raw politics, which is 
deeply embedded in the administrative dimension. Also, the picture casts doubts 
on the validity of the delegation type of fiscal governance – at least, of a reading 
that makes fiscal responsibility depend on the concentration alone of budgetary 
capabilities into a single body within the cabinet. In the Italian case, such concen-
tration did occur: yet, in so doing, the ownership of the process had been given 
less to the Finance Minister than to the State General Accounting Department. 
And the information asymmetry that the Accounting Department maintains with 
its parent ministry, then the cabinet, and finally the parliament is remarkable 
indeed. The Department is the only that really masters the details of the national 
expenditures – and the only capable of drawing up the financial law, too. It is 
hence the true addressee of pressures, and the one that can accommodate them. 
However, the Department has also been kept incapable of evaluating expendi-
tures on their merits – which it instead treats on the basis of political closeness 
when necessary. The State General Accounting Department thus fully exerts its 
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ownership of the process from the perspective of bookkeeping – the false neutral-
ity of which makes room to irresponsible demands. It is hence the mix of book-
keeping rationale and raw-political criteria of decision about expenditures that, 
together, generate the conflicts which the bargaining in the cabinet can provide 
a fleeting fix, and that later go off in the parliament. Basically, irresponsibility 
stems from the combination of enduring irresponsible pressures and opaque dis-
tributional criteria in budgeting that the Accounting Department maintains – a 
mechanism that the regime change left untouched.
Such reading of Italian ineffectiveness entails a further theoretical consid-
eration: even under the concentration of fiscal powers, responsibility cannot 
be delivered unless the central budget authority, and the bureaucracy, are held 
accountable for it. If such accountability is due from elected officials only, then 
the governance design can deliver only under condition of a clear widespread 
electoral mandate for fiscal responsibility that the delegation type can enforce 
and the next election can reward. Yet, the Italian political and social context is 
intrinsically plural especially as for fiscal preferences, to the point that even a 
majoritarian exercise has proven unable to compress them. Under such condi-
tions, political accountability for fiscal responsibility becomes an erratic exercise 
of rhetoric unless a contract is provided. Thus, the inability of the new design to 
deliver can ultimately be ascribed to a reform strategy inadequate to the context. 
A more effective solution hence rests less on some further strengthening of the 
delegation model than in the shift toward the alternative type. And it is in such 
alternative direction that the European Union is currently pushing the Italian 
fiscal governance.
4  The European Union as a Push Factor
That the contract type can be an especially productive model for national reforms 
is a belief shared by the European institutions, too. To them, the priority is the sta-
bility of the Euro-area, hindered by two phenomena only partially overlapping: 
on the one side, the enduring fiscal irresponsibility of some Members; on the 
other, the low convergence of national macroeconomic and fiscal policies. And 
it is from a very “Dutch” perspective that the recent Fiscal Compact3 addresses 
these problems.
3 That is, the “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union,” signed in 2012 which reformed the previous “Stability and Growth Pact,” enforcing the 
Treaty of Maastricht on the Economic and Monetary Union.
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4.1  European Provisions for Institutional Change
In order to increase the binding force of the European constraints, the Compact 
and the related provisions intervene mainly on the procedural dimension, so to 
couple the domestic budgeting processes to the European decisions more tightly. 
Downstream, now the Union requires the Members to link their expenditures 
explicitly to the common goals of Europe 2020 – the strategy for a “smart, sus-
tainable and inclusive growth”4 which continues the Lisbon strategy. Upstream, 
the European Commission instituted the so-called “European Semester” during 
which a technical dialogue takes place with the national authorities about the 
knowledge base of the domestic budgeting process – so to secure it is compliant 
to minimal standards, and later used for fiscal decision.
The Compact then considers expenditures and revenues less as norma-
tive elements of domestic social pacts between governments and their citizens 
than – pragmatically – as policy tools through which the national system can 
improve the performance of relevance to the European membership. Directive 
85/2011/EC, which anticipated many of the Compact’s provisions, requires that 
national planning makes out clear the reasons beneath the choice of instru-
ments, their setting, and their short-, mid- and long-term financial effects under 
different scenarios, as well as the non-financial effects. The Directive also 
commits the Member states and their subnational authorities to make a trans-
parent and accessible use of both the data and the methods to prove the effec-
tiveness and the sustainability of their expenditure and revenues over time – so 
that the executive’s reasons can be contested at the European as well as at the 
domestic level. The prescription is made binding by the provision that, in case 
of non-compliance, the Commission herself will provide the knowledge base for 
the national fiscal decision – which would actually put the national government 
under receivership.
The enhanced fiscal governance so draws incentives that press each Member 
country to equip with a proper performance budgeting, and to make the perfor-
mance measures into key elements of the budgeting process at every level of gov-
ernment. As such, it mainly operates on the accountability side of the national 
fiscal governance and relies on the logic of the contract type to close the door on 
irresponsibility.
4 The strategy revolves around substantive output or performance targets in five policy areas – 
employment, education, research, energy innovation, social inclusion – that the national gov-
ernments are committed to achieve. See COM (2010) 2020 fin, and the European Commission 
website http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm
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4.2  So Far, is Italy Changing?
Italy has promptly aligned with the European prescriptions of the Fiscal Compact, 
in some case even anticipating them. At the same time, it has understood its con-
tents quite peculiarly.
Law no. 196 of 2009 and following modifications intervene on the whole of 
the decision-making process, especially on the point of transparency in planning. 
The Defp is so replaced by the new «Decision of Public Finance» (Dpf), whose 
contents are organized and developed according to the European prescriptions. 
Although its capacity to constrain the following decision-making still proves 
weak, the Dpf however puts an end to the practice of the executive’s double and 
different justification of its budgetary decisions – to Europe and to the parliament.
Moreover, to improve the knowledge underlying the financial decision, Law no. 
196 prescribes the standardization of the many accounting practices that the govern-
ments and public enterprises at different levels were previously allowed to main-
tain. The new «Integrated bookkeeping plan» defined by Legislative Decrees no. 
91/2011 and no. 118/2011 also obliges all the bodies of the public sector to organize 
their budgetary data alike, according to the European criteria established for calcu-
lating public deficit and debt, and to supply them electronically to the State General 
Accounting Department – which still remains the owner of the central databank.
Law no. 196 also requires the “missions” and “programs” of the budget to be 
organized according to the European classification of the functions of govern-
ment (Cofog), previously used for statistical reporting to Europe yet not in the 
domestic budgetary process – in which the key reference had always been the 
legal basis of each item of expenditure. According to Law no. 196, the functional 
units of the Cofog are so meant to structure the parliament’s votes, thus reducing 
them to a manageable amount of less detailed decisions; but also to facilitate 
agencies’ accountability, as missions and programs are to be associated to func-
tional outcomes and outputs.
Legislative Decree no. 123/2011 completes the design of the new performance 
budgeting by complementing the usual control of legal conformity with evalua-
tions based on “economic and statistical methodologies” so to improve the “effi-
ciency” and “effectiveness” of spending. Such shift toward the contract type of 
fiscal governance involves the State General Accounting Department, too. The 
Decree gives it the responsibility of coordinating a network of “Units for analy-
sis and evaluation” of the agencies’ and public enterprises’ spending; as a con-
sequence, it pushes the Department to internalize new competences consistent 
with its coordination tasks, and different from classical bookkeeping. Yet the 
Decree also states that the total of personnel cannot increase – which conditions 
the change in the Department's competences to the pace of “natural” turnover. 
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Also, the Evaluation Units are assigned general competences to “verify efficiency, 
effectiveness and adequacy” of allocations; yet, they have to report their results 
yearly to the line ministries, and only every 3 years to the parliament. In the short-
term, moreover, the Legislative Decree just required the Evaluation Units to see 
whether any mandatory expenditure could be reclassified as non-mandatory for 
cut, but without further opinion – while no performance indicator has still for-
mally been attached to outlays.
At least in the short-term, thus, the reform does seem at risk to fall short of 
the European intentions – unless a “policy entrepreneur” intervenes to pull the 
institutional change on the track of the contract type of governance. And, again, 
the reform of 2009 actually provides such interest by design. After years of com-
pression of its budgeting powers, the parliament is restored its position within 
the fiscal governance. Law no. 196 of 2009 requires the Mef to give yearly reasons 
of the enforcement of the performance budgeting to the Houses, so returning the 
ultimate political property rights on the reform to the parliament. Also, following 
the Law’s “Measures for the transparency and controllability of spending,” the 
parliamentary committees are required to produce observations and evaluations 
about the data and the methods used by the executive to draft the budget, as well 
as to contribute to the monitoring, control and scrutiny of the financial trends. 
For this purpose, the Law established the right of access of the House and the 
Senate to every databank and other relevant sources, as well as the obligation 
to the executive of publishing all its decisions. Law no. 196 hence fully recog-
nises the parliament’s power to intervene on the knowledge for budgeting, also 
 providing it with the opportunity to draw informed amendments independent 
from interest groups and their knowledge.
This, however, is precisely just an opportunity. To make use of it, the parlia-
ment does require incentives and competencies. The enduring sensitivity of the 
public opinion and the voters toward waste can easily provide the former. The 
latter are lacking, instead (Regonini 2012).
True, the Constitutional Law no. 1 of 2012 – besides the constitutionalisation 
of the balanced budget, the obligation to agencies and subnational governments 
to contribute to it, and the definition of standard of accounting and statistics as 
exclusive competence of the central government – established “the institution in 
the Houses … of an independent body with the task of analysing and scrutinis-
ing the budget trends and of evaluating the compliance with the budget rules” 
(art.5.1.f). This ruling, even if seemingly undecided between a monitoring and 
an evaluation function for parliament, can provide the missing piece of the new 
governance jigsaw. Whether the new Parliamentary Budget Office will make the 
Houses into the main accountee of the executive, or will play as the agent of 
the Mef into the parliament so to discipline its amending activity, or will even 
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prove of little use but symbolical, it cannot however be said yet, as its board was 
appointed only on April, 30 2014.
5  Conclusions
The Italian case shows how a remarkable effort to remove the political incen-
tives to opportunism can result into a failure when made along the lines of an 
inadequate governance model. According to theory, nor the delegation neither 
the contract type can deliver if the bureaucracy is left free to drift from the finan-
cial decision; but only an explicit contract provides those constraints that can 
discipline pressures and drifts in the post-legislative as well as in the legislative 
stages of budgeting, by keeping all the players accountable to numerical perfor-
mance indicators. When imposed to a structurally plural context, the delegation 
type hence proves ineffective: in itself, the concentration of budgetary capabili-
ties does not guarantee that the budgeting process is effectively shielded from 
pressures, and that the benevolent dictator will not fall for the lure or the neces-
sity of irresponsibility. That is why better performance is here deemed to descend 
from the adoption of the alternative type – a contract that structures the public 
budget around performance targets for which explicit accountability is due. The 
negotiation alone of numeric performance indicators, and the related evaluation 
of expenditures, can secure the identification and the debarring of opportunistic 
spending, and of the underlying short-terministic demands, as an ineffective con-
tribution to policy success.
The activation of fiscal responsibility through contract in Italy however almost 
requires a reversal of the rationale followed by the previous institutional reforms. 
Such “governance by policy knowledge” implies that the political property rights 
on the budget, its targets, and the related evaluation criteria are given back to the 
parliament (Schick 2002; Stapenhurst et al. 2008). As far as fiscal responsibility 
depends on the criteria used to discriminate among pressures, constrain behav-
ior and promote learning, the Assembly has a central role to play – less as sub-
servient majority to the executive than as the arena where fiscal preferences are 
responsibly molded into the budget, and heterogeneous interests composed into 
shared binding goals. As a consequence of the previous attempts at sterilizing 
political incentives to opportunism, however, the Italian parliament is now put 
at disadvantage in the knowledge game. New institutional rules consistent with 
the contract rationale of the European enhanced fiscal governance do provide the 
opportunity of such reversal; so far, however, the opportunity remains on paper, 
as the parliament still lacks the resources to enter the domestic and international 
technical dialogue successfully.
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To fill the gap, the parliament hence should internalize the capabilities for 
influencing the definition of proper performance indicators; running independ-
ent evaluation of instrument effectiveness; scrutinizing the plausibility of the 
estimations beneath the executive’s draft under different scenarios. The Parlia-
mentary Budget Office theoretically provides a suitable solution – to the extent 
that it is properly designed, financed and staffed. Without this all, the last gov-
ernance reform could remain a symbolic exercise unable to amend deeply embed-
ded irresponsible customary practices – with the easy consequence of reinforcing 
an opportunism whose effects, however, appear less and less bearable.
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